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Abstract 
 
The purpose of this paper is to develop a purely mathematical approach to determining consumer 
demand. The model developed allows the researcher to derive demand in an oligopoly market 
from observed firm output and market prices using only assumptions about each firm, modest 
restrictions on consumer behavior, and limitations on market structure. The advantage of this 
revealed demand approach is that it does not require the specification of the consumer’s utility 
function or any firm’s production function. In addition, this mathematical approach allows for the 
estimation of own price and cross price elasticities of demand without statistical regression.  
 
The mathematical model developed is applied to the automobile industry assuming a market 
characterized by Cournot-Nash behavior and divided into five homogenous vehicle segments. A 
global optimization program is used to mathematically determine the range of values the 
coefficients of demand must take in each segment to satisfy market equilibrium. These coefficients 
can be used to estimate own and cross price elasticities of demand and construct demand 
equations.  
 
The elasticity estimates generated by the mathematical model of the automobile industry are 
compared to other estimates of elasticity found by statistical estimation. It is shown that the 
mathematical model generates results that are consistent with the statistical methods of the 
automobile market used by other researchers.   
 
 
Introduction 
 
ecent methods of estimating demand in the automobile market have focused on treating vehicle 
purchases as a bundle of characteristics for which consumers have preferences. It assumes that each 
consumer chooses the vehicle that contains the bundle of characteristics that maximizes utility. 
Market demand is obtained from the aggregation of consumers' choices. In order to aggregate these results, the 
functional form of the utility function must be specified. The functional form of the utility function is selected so 
individual preferences may be aggregated into an overall demand function in each vehicle segment. This method 
allows the researcher to estimate the value consumers place on different vehicle characteristics.  
 
Berry, Levinsohn, and Pakes (1995) use this approach. In their paper, they establish a general approach to 
determining market demand coefficients by using a set of first order conditions that must be satisfied for equilibrium 
to occur in the Cournot-Nash framework. They then solve these first order conditions in terms of the coefficients of 
vehicle characteristics and prices. This approach is referred to in this paper as a Revealed Demand System (RDS) 
because it assumes firms behave in a certain manner and from this assumption the coefficients of demand are 
revealed. 
R 
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Berry, et al. apply their general approach in the following manner. They first assume a utility function for 
each consumer of the same particular functional form, for example Cobb-Douglas, so that these individual consumer 
preferences may be aggregated into a market demand. Their utility function depends on certain vehicle 
characteristics: air conditioning, miles per dollar, size, and horsepower to weight. Before estimation, the utility 
functions are aggregated to generate a market demand function. Then a linear cost function with respect to those 
characteristics is assumed and combined with the market demand function to find the Cournot-Nash first order 
conditions for equilibrium in terms of vehicle characteristics only. These first order conditions yield a system of 
equations in terms of vehicle characteristics, quantity produced by each firm, and market prices. It is this system of 
equations that they ―take to the data‖ for logit regression estimation of the unknown coefficients of vehicle 
characteristics. 
 
Goldberg (1995) and Arguea and Hsiao (1993) each use Berry, Levinsohn and Pakes’ approach. Goldberg 
extends the model by using a nested logit formulation rather than simple logit estimation. This allows for more 
reasonable substitution patterns, but again it specifies a utility function.  
 
Arguea and Hsiao add the condition that certain vehicle characteristics are subject to competitive arbitrage. 
Fershtman, et al. (1999) extend the model. Instead of solving for marginal cost and then regressing the results, he 
derives input demand functions and solves them in terms of demand characteristics only. He then proceeds in the 
Berry, Levinsohn, and Pakes framework to find coefficients on vehicle characteristics. 
 
A limitation of these approaches is that specifying the functional form of the utility function limits the 
nature of consumer utility and generates specific patterns of substitution that may not be consistent with consumer 
behavior. 
 
Approach Used in this Paper 
 
This paper uses a different approach. Like Berry, Levinsohn, and Pakes (BLP), firms will be assumed to 
follow the Cournot-Nash assumptions and each firm’s first order condition will be used to reveal consumer demand, 
however, that is where the similarities end. Instead of restricting the consumer’s utility function, restrictions are 
placed on market structure. In particular, vehicles within each segment are considered homogenous. With this 
restriction and limitations on vehicle production cost, each firm’s first order conditions are used to determine what 
price elasticities must have been to explain the observed pricing and output decisions of each firm.  
 
The assumption of homogenous segments may seem to be strong, but it is not unreasonable. If producers 
are responsive to consumer desires and consumers value a particular feature, producers will want to provide that 
feature especially if other producers in the same segment are offering that feature. In this way, vehicles in the same 
class will likely contain a common set of characteristics. In fact, this view is substantiated by the work of Fairen 
(1996). This research found vehicle characteristics did tend to converge toward a common set of features. Therefore, 
the assumption that vehicle characteristics are the same within a segment is reasonable.  
 
Because this approach assumes homogenous segments, the first order conditions do not include vehicle 
characteristics. Each firm produces vehicles within a segment with a common set of characteristics and therefore the 
characteristics of the vehicle are not a choice variable for producers. With homogenous vehicle characteristics 
within each segment, each firm’s only decision is how many units to produce in each segment given how production 
in each segment will affect their vehicle sales in other segments and how their pricing will cause competitors to 
react. This latter factor can be ignored if one assumes that firms fail to consider how the other firms will react. That 
is, if one assumes Cournot-Nash behavior, the only decision relevant to each firm is how its increased production 
will influence sales in each segment.  
 
The assumption of homogenous segments greatly simplifies the first order conditions, but it also results in 
an inability to determine how much consumers value each feature. Without vehicle characteristics in the first order 
conditions, there are no coefficients to establish how much consumers value each characteristic individually. 
However, without differing vehicle characteristics, this approach does not require the including vehicle 
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characteristics in each firm’s first order conditions—reducing the complexity of the system of first order conditions. 
In addition, because producers have the same common set of features for each vehicle, the production costs for each 
vehicle can be represented by a single cost of production that includes all production costs including the cost of 
selling the vehicles through dealerships.   
 
This method is analogous to the revealed preference method used in utility theory. Just as consumer 
behavior, given known constraints, reveals the consumer’s underlying utility function; a firm’s behavior, given 
certain assumptions, can reveal important aspects of consumer demand.  
 
A Revealed Demand Approach to Estimating Demand Systems 
 
The revealed demand approach determines the elasticites of demand at equilibrium by assuming firms act 
in a certain manner. In this case, firms are assumed profit maximizers in the Cournot-Nash framework. Accordingly, 
each firm seeks to maximize profits assuming changes in their output will not change the output decisions of 
competing firms. However, they do take into account how changes in their own output will impact market price. 
Since one of the manufacturing assumptions made above is that the marginal cost of producing each good is 
independent of the production of the other goods, each firm’s objective function is: 
 
Max profits:  = P Q – TC where P is the vector of prices in each automotive segment, Q is the vector of 
quantities produced by each firm in each segment and TC is the total cost of all production in each segment.  
 
Therefore, assuming the cost of production in one market segment is independent of the quantity produced 
in any other market segment, each i
th
 firm’s first order conditions (FOC) are1: 
  
FOCs repeated for each of N firms 
 
Where {x, y, …, z} represent the different products each firm can make. Px, Py, Pz are the market prices at 
equilibrium, and Xi , Yi , Zi are the quantities produced by the i
th 
firm at equilibrium, and MC is the marginal cost of 
the last unit produced.  
 
For a Cournot-Nash equilibrium to exist each of the FOC listed in equation set 1 must simultaneously hold. 
 
After substituting for the known variables of market price in each market segment and quantity sold in each 
market segment by each firm, the above system of equations can be solved for the coefficients of demand in terms of 
each firm’s marginal costs and the coefficients of demand. 
                                                 
1 Each firm’s actual FOC is 
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Since the effect of an increase in output by any firm has the same effect on price as an increase in industry 
output in the Cournot-Nash equilibrium, this means that for all firms i k: 
...
x x x x
T i j k
P P P P
x x x x
   
   
              
 
where xT is industry output. 
 
Therefore, if the marginal cost of the last unit sold by each firm were known, the above system of equations 
would be expressed solely in terms of the coefficients of demand.  
 
There are two difficulties with this approach. First, some variables may not be precisely known. Second, 
the number of unknown variables may be greater than the number of equations resulting in equations that are solved 
not only in terms of known variables but also in terms of unknown variables. Not explicitly solving the system of 
equations, but rather determining a range of values that satisfy the system of equations, however, can address both of 
these problems. To do so, certain assumptions are made about consumer behavior and the range of values that 
certain variables must take. Therefore, the coefficients of demand in each market segment can be found within a 
certain range. From these coefficients, elasticities of demand can be calculated.  
 
Potential Problems with Incorrectly Specifying the Market Structure 
 
Since this model uses firm behavior and market structure to determine demand, misspecification of the 
market structure can lead to incorrect results. In particular, there are two misspecifications to be examined. The first 
is if the homogenous assumption of the model does not hold. In particular, if the model incorrectly combines 
unrelated vehicle segments, the results could be incorrect. The second is the improper combining of unrelated firms. 
In this research, smaller firms with separate ownership are assumed to act as a one unified firm, this could result in 
underestimating the amount of competition in the market. This could result in attributing the price that prevails in 
the market to consumer preferences rather than a higher level of competition. Since either of these model 
misspecifications could affect the results, the consequences of these misspecifications should be examined.  
 
First, suppose in specifying the market structure that unrelated segments are lumped together as one unit. 
Accordingly, the average price used in the revealed demand system (RDS) would really be the average of the price 
between the two markets and total output would be the combination of the two markets. As a result, the RDS will 
find the elasticities that explain this average pricing and output behavior. Therefore, the RDS will estimate a 
weighted average of the two markets and the RDS’ elasticity estimates will not reflect the true elasticity of the 
individual markets. However, since the elasticity estimate is a weighted average of the two markets, the results are 
influenced as any average would. In other words, the RDS estimate of elasticities will be closer to the market with 
more observations. However, if the elasticities of the individual segments are close, then the elasticities found by the 
RDS will be close.  
 
The impact of the second type of misspecification, incorrectly combining firms to act as one firm, is less 
severe, assuming the remaining firms are correctly specified. In particular, if two competing firms that make 
independent output decisions are incorrectly assumed to behave as one single decision making body, the RDS will 
incorrectly attribute the combined firm’s high level of output to a lower cost of production rather than competition.  
 
The possibility of incorrect combination is not a severe problem because regardless of the number of firms 
in the market, the correctly specified individual firm’s first order condition equations will stay the same. Therefore, 
the correctly specified firms’ first order condition equations still must be satisfied and can only be satisfied by a 
limited range of elasticities and costs. This means the estimates of elasticities at market equilibrium by the RDS 
must still explain the correctly specified firms’ output decisions and therefore be close to the true values of 
elasticities.  
 
(2) 
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Thus far, the properties of the demand system were specified and previous methods of demand estimation 
were examined. Next, this approach is applied to the automobile market to estimate vehicle elasticities.  
 
Applying the RDS to the Automobile Industry 
 
To obtain estimates of the coefficients on demand requires establishing the market structure and then 
obtaining the relevant data.  
 
Market Structure 
 
Since the top three automakers, General Motors, Ford, and Chrysler held around 75 percent of the U.S. 
market during the 1989-1996 time frame of this study, and none of the remaining firms obtained much more than 10 
percent market share, the remaining firms were combined into one firm called ―Alternative producers.‖ The U.S. 
auto market consists of new vehicles sold in the U.S., regardless of manufacturing location.  
 
Therefore, the model of the automobile industry used in this paper consists of firms grouped into the four 
following divisions: 
 
1. Ford 
2. Chrysler 
3. General Motors 
4. Alternative producers 
 
Vehicles were assigned into homogenous segments partially on use, but also on manufacturing facilities. 
The view of homogenous segments is supported by manufacturing reports from Harbour, an industry trade 
publication, which show that a variety of models share the same manufacturing facilities for many of their key 
components. For example, Ford’s Lima, Peru production facility makes an engine that is used for Ranger pickups, 
Aerostar/Windstar vans, and Sable/Taurus sedans. In addition, Ford also uses the same transmissions in a wide 
assortment of vehicles from their large Crown Victoria sedans, Econoline vans, F-series pickups, Expedition and 
Explorer SUVs, to Mustang sports cars. 
 
As Friedlaender et al. (1983) observed ―Not only are the same dies used to produce parts for a wide range 
of different models and makes, but parts and major components such as engines are often interchangeable as well. 
Therefore, from the point of view of production it seems reasonable to define output in terms of broad product lines 
(e.g. luxury, full size, compact, subcompact, etc.).Each of which has a range of generic attributes (e.g. wheelbase, 
weight, engine displacement, etc.).‖  
 
Furthermore, the assumption of homogenous segments is also supported by Fairen (1996). In his study, 
Fairen found that vehicle characteristics tend to converge toward a common set of features. Therefore, the 
assumption that vehicle characteristics are homogenous within each segment is reasonable.   
 
Vehicles are assigned to segments as determined by Ward’s Automotive. Ward’s Automotive is an industry 
observer that collects information on various aspects of the automobile industry. The segments are generally 
organized according to vehicle characteristics, and coincidentally, emission rates. The following categories divide 
the automobile market into five homogenous segments: 
 
1. Small Sedan 
2. Large Sedan 
3. SUVs  
4. Pickups and Vans 
5. Luxury Vehicles 
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The number of firms and products are limited for two reasons. First, not every small firm produces vehicles 
in every segment. Second, for computational reasons it was necessary to limit the number of firms and products 
because the time required for computation increases dramatically as the number of products and number of firms 
increase. 
 
The Data 
 
The next step in applying the RDS is obtaining the relevant data. The data required is vehicle price in each 
segment, vehicle sales by each producer in each segment, and the marginal cost of the last vehicle sold by each 
producer in each segment. 
 
Vehicle Price Data 
 
Information from the Consumer Expenditure Survey was used to obtain estimates of vehicle price in each 
segment as paid by consumers. The Consumer Expenditure Survey (CES) conducted by the Bureau of Labor 
Statistics contains information about all individual household purchases, demographic information and household 
income. The CES contains information on household vehicle purchases by make, model and year, and reports the 
price paid for each vehicle. For this paper, vehicle price in each segment was estimated from the average price paid 
by households for vehicles in the corresponding segment. 
 
Vehicle Sales Data and Segment Categorization 
 
Vehicle sales and segmentation data were obtained from Ward’s Automotive. Ward’s Automotive reports 
automobile sales in nine segments: commercial, cross utility, large sedan, mid-size sedan, small car, pickup, sport 
utility, van, and luxury vehicle. Commercial vehicles were not included in this paper since their demand is likely to 
be significantly different from consumer demand. Cross utility vehicles were combined into SUV sales since these 
vehicles are very similar and this category was not created until 1996. Mid-size sedans were combined into large 
sedan sales because the price of vehicles in the large category had prices comparable to, and many cases cheaper, 
than mid-size sedans. Vans and pickups were combined into one segment for two reasons. First, these vehicles are 
similarly priced and are interchangeable to many consumers. Second, vans and pickups use many of the same 
components and production facilities so their cost of production is similar.  
 
The model used in this paper assumes that vehicles within each segment are homogenous hence the 
collection of average price paid in each segment. This assumption is also consistent with research done by Bajic in 
which he found strong substitutability between automobile characteristics (Bajic 1993). 
 
Marginal Cost Data 
 
The next piece of data collected was marginal cost, but exact information about the marginal cost of the last 
unit for each automobile producer was not readily available. Each corporation closely holds this information, for 
obvious competitive reasons. Therefore, ranges of reasonable costs were assumed that were consistent with 
information found in the Harbour Yearbook, an industry trade publication, and information provided by the Office 
of Automotive Transportation. The Office of Automotive Transportation provided information regarding the 
minimum gross profit per vehicle per segment and the minimum marginal cost of each vehicle.  
 
The minimum marginal cost of vehicle production in each category was reported to be greater than $8000 
in each segment. More specific information was not available. This marginal cost estimate includes on-site 
manufacturing cost, delivery, variable marketing agreements, and dealer compensation.  
To summarize, gross profit and marginal cost data were reported to be the following
2
: 
 
1. Gross profit of at least $1000 on small vehicles 
                                                 
2 The gross profit figures were obtained from internal domestic producer documents. 
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2. Gross profit of at least $3500 on mid to large vehicles 
3. Gross profit of at least $5000 on all other vehicles 
4. Marginal cost of at least $8000 on all vehicles 
 
Application of Gross Profit Data 
 
The gross profit information is very important because it allows for the calculation of a range of values that 
contain the true marginal cost; if marginal cost equals average variable cost, then gross profits can be used to 
estimate marginal cost. This is illustrated below: 
 
Since gross profit per vehicle = price – average variable cost, and 
 
1. If marginal cost = average variable cost, then  
2. gross profit per vehicle = price – marginal cost. 
 
Therefore, given gross profit per vehicle and the assumption that AVC=MC, if price and gross profit per 
vehicle are known, then marginal cost would be known.  
 
However, gross profit is not precisely known. Instead, it is known that gross profit is greater than the 
amounts mentioned earlier, therefore, it can only be said that marginal cost is less than a certain amount: 
MC < price – gross profit per vehicle 
 
Production Characteristics of the Industry  
 
It is not assumed that every manufacturer’s marginal cost equals average variable cost. In fact, it is only 
assumed that one manufacturer’s marginal cost equals average variable cost. That manufacturer is General Motors 
(G.M.) because of the nature of G.M.’s production capacity compared to other automakers as explained next. 
 
The assumption that G.M.’s marginal cost is equal to its average variable cost is based in part on the fact 
that the automobile industry is very capital intensive. When a firm is highly capital-intensive productivity remains 
high over large ranges of output since machines can perform repetitive tasks for long periods without losing 
efficiency. Therefore, if a firm in this industry is not working too close to full capacity, where machinery would 
become a constraining factor, the marginal cost of the last unit should be very close to the marginal cost on the first 
unit. Furthermore, since the scale of the operation is so large, any setup costs are distributed over enough units that 
the setup costs have a negligible effect on average variable cost. This means that the marginal cost of the last unit 
would be very close to the overall average variable cost.  
 
Distinguishing Production Characteristics of G.M. 
 
Average variable cost is assumed to equal marginal cost for G.M. based on their excess capacity. The need 
for regular down-time maintenance of their machinery causes most auto manufacturers to operate their production 
facilities for only two shifts, although Chrysler routinely operates three shifts (Harbour Yearbook). If a firm is 
operating at the maximum of the two-shift capacity, the marginal cost to produce the next vehicle would be very 
high because a whole additional shift would be needed to produce the additional unit. Further, a firm that decides to 
operate three shifts has increased maintenance costs due to the difficulty of performing maintenance while a shift is 
working or trying to perform maintenance during shorter time intervals (Harbour Yearbook).  These factors result in 
the marginal cost of additional units requiring a third shift to be much higher than average variable cost. 
 
G.M. production levels seldom require a third shift (Habour Reports), and therefore it is unlikely that 
G.M.’s marginal cost varies significantly from its average variable cost. This may not be true for other 
manufacturers who operate close to 2-shift capacity and may need to add a third shift from time to time to increase 
vehicle production. Therefore, constraints can reasonably be placed on G.M.’s gross profits but not on the other 
manufacturers. 
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Additional Assumptions Needed to Apply the Model 
 
Since exact values for the marginal cost of each manufacturer are not known, the entire RDS model can not 
be solved for the exact partials (price elasticities). It is possible to construct a limited range of possible elasticities 
given some assumptions about demand and the cost advantages of certain producers. In particular, the following 
additional assumptions will be made: 
 
1. Coefficients on demand must be substitutes in consumption 
2. Cross price effects are symmetric 
3. Own price effects must be greater than cross price effects 
4. Restrictions derived from comparing marginal costs between segments and between firms given their 
respective market shares (as explained below) 
 
The first assumption implies that all coefficients of demand are less than zero, demand is downward 
sloping, and all cars are substitutes of some degree for each other. The second assumption that cross price 
coefficients are symmetric guarantees a maximum solution rather than a minimum. Further it stipulates that for 
substitutes an increase in quantity in one segment will impact price in the other segment the same as an increase in 
the quantity in the other will impact the price of the first good. This is true as long as there is not an income effect 
from the purchase of automobiles. This assumption is reasonable given that a consumer is unlikely to buy more than 
one vehicle because of a slight decline in price. The third assumption that own price effects are greater than cross 
price effects assures that vehicles within the same segment are closer substitutes than vehicles in other segments.  
 
The fourth assumption includes the following restrictions: 
 
1. Following Cournot-Nash behavioral assumptions, the firm with the greater production will have a lower 
marginal cost than a lower producing competitor. 
2. The marginal cost of the last vehicle sold is less than the price of the vehicle. 
3. Cross price coefficients have less impact on price than own price coefficients. 
 
To be consistent with what is known about vehicle production costs and gross profits between different 
vehicle segments, the following restrictions were also imposed: 
 
1. The marginal cost for G.M. to make a large sedan is less than the marginal cost of G.M. to make a SUV or 
luxury vehicle. 
2. The marginal cost for G.M. to make a pickup is less than the marginal cost for G.M. to make a luxury 
vehicle. 
3. The markup for G.M. on small vehicles is less than the markup for G.M. on pickups or luxury vehicles. 
4. The markup for G.M. on large sedans is less than the markup on SUVs. 
5. The markup for G.M. on pickups is less than the markup on luxury vehicles. 
 
In addition, all coefficients are assumed to be less than –0.00000001. In other words, if vehicle production 
in any segment during one quarter increased by 10 million units then all vehicle prices would be impacted by at least 
$1. Given that total vehicle production in one quarter does not exceed 10 million units, this restriction seems 
reasonable. Finally, all coefficients are assumed to be greater than -1 which means that all coefficients are between -
1 and -0.00000001. The restriction that all coefficients are greater than -1 is needed to limit the search area for the 
global optimization program; it is not binding and has no impact on the model. 
 
First Order Conditions 
 
Applying the first order conditions found in the prior chapter to the defined four firms, five product market, 
generates the following 20 first order conditions for profit maximization and consistency with the Cournot-Nash 
equilibrium: 
Journal of Business and Economics Research  Volume 2, Number 9 
 75 
 
0
0
0
0
0
55
5
5
4
5
4
3
5
3
2
5
2
1
5
1
5
45
4
5
4
4
4
3
4
3
2
4
2
1
4
1
4
35
3
5
4
3
4
3
3
3
2
3
2
1
3
1
3
25
2
5
4
2
4
3
2
3
2
2
2
1
2
1
2
15
1
5
4
1
4
3
1
3
2
1
2
1
1
1
1
















































































iiiiiii
iiiiiii
iiiiiii
iiiiiii
iiiiiii
MCq
q
p
q
q
p
q
q
p
q
q
p
q
q
p
p
MCq
q
p
q
q
p
q
q
p
q
q
p
q
q
p
p
MCq
q
p
q
q
p
q
q
p
q
q
p
q
q
p
p
MCq
q
p
q
q
p
q
q
p
q
q
p
q
q
p
p
MCq
q
p
q
q
p
q
q
p
q
q
p
q
q
p
p
     
For each i
th
 firm, where the partials are the own and cross price coefficients, and the q
i
 variables represent 
the number of vehicles sold by the i
th
 firm in market segments 1 through 5. Where p represents the price in each 
segment, and the MC
i
 variables represent the marginal cost of the i
th
 producer in market segments 1 through 5.  
 
Determining Coefficient Values that Satisfy the FOCs 
 
Since prices and quantities sold by each firm are known, the first order system of equations can be solved 
for the own price and cross price coefficients of demand. The only exception is that five price coefficient variables 
can not be solved since the number of unknown variables is greater than the number of equations. Therefore, the 
optimization program will consider the price coefficients as exogenous. The remaining coefficients of demand can 
be expressed in terms of known variables and the exogenous variables. In particular, each coefficient of demand is 
solved in terms of the marginal cost of production for each firm in each segment, prices, and the exogenous price 
coefficients. The first order equations for each quarter were solved by Mathematica.  
 
Summarizing, if prices, quantity sold by each firm, the marginal cost of the last unit sold by each firm, and 
the exogenous price coefficients were known, these coefficient equations would reveal the value of the remaining 
coefficients of demand.   
 
Revealed Demand 
 
While the exogenous cross price coefficient variables are not known, and marginal cost is only known 
within certain values, the exogenous coefficients of demand are still bound by the first order conditions and the 
assumptions of the model. This effectively limits the range of values these variables can take, and thus, reveals the 
coefficients of demand even for these exogenous coefficients. These coefficients can be used to calculate own and 
cross price elasticities. 
 
Using the constraints and the coefficient equations established in this chapter, a range of values was 
calculated for each coefficient. This was done using the Frontline Systems global optimization software to find the 
minimum/maximum value each coefficient on demand could take while satisfying the coefficient equations and the 
restricting assumptions. The quarterly results of the optimization program are reported in own price elasticity form 
in Table 1. 
 
Table 1: Own price Elasticities by Quarter 
Quarter 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 
Max small sedan -3.62   -1.96 -2.90 -3.44 -4.03 -4.71 -6.25 
Min small sedan -1.42   -1.44 -1.83 -1.62 -1.43 -1.35 -1.36 
(3) 
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Max Large sedan -2.36   -3.26 -1.51 -3.39 -3.38 -3.60 -3.54 
Min Large sedan -0.92   -0.96 -0.81 -0.83 -0.86 -0.82 -0.77 
Max SUVs -2.65   -2.65 -1.93 -1.74 -2.12 -1.91 -15.27 
Min SUVs -0.67   -0.76 -0.76 -0.65 -0.64 -0.62 -0.52 
Max Pickups/vans -3.94   -5.99 -1.32 -5.62 -5.92 -5.68 -5.61 
Min Pickups/vans -0.95   -1.14 -1.06 -1.22 -0.91 -0.84 -0.82 
Max Luxury -14.03   -20.78 -3.26 -21.32 -22.81 -20.98 -15.92 
Min Luxury -0.56   -0.62 -0.47 -0.53 -0.49 -0.53 -0.54 
         
Quarter 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 
Max small sedan -1.75 -3.25 -8.00 -2.97 -8.92 -2.02 -4.94 -10.17 
Min small sedan -1.44 -1.84 -1.40 -1.18 -1.24 -1.25 -1.23 -1.01 
Max Large sedan -1.30 -1.44 -4.10 -1.65 -1.11 -4.01 -3.95 -1.68 
Min Large sedan -0.84 -0.85 -0.79 -0.76 -0.71 -0.74 -0.65 -0.58 
Max SUVs -2.19 -1.12 -14.63 -7.54 -2.43 -3.45 -1.93 -3.22 
Min SUVs -1.06 -0.55 -0.49 -0.51 -0.55 -0.52 -0.54 -0.47 
Max Pickups/vans -5.39 -4.48 -4.69 -4.89 -6.23 -6.92 -4.89 -6.38 
Min Pickups/vans -1.07 -0.95 -0.79 -0.83 -0.74 -0.72 -0.86 -0.73 
Max Luxury -17.65 -21.28 -10.99 -18.80 -23.49 -22.12 -14.55 -12.80 
Min Luxury -0.59 -0.53 -0.62 -0.65 -0.49 -0.51 -0.56 -0.49 
         
Quarter 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 
Max small sedan -1.81 -4.10 -4.63 -8.13 -1.90 -7.37 -3.04 -13.99 
Min small sedan -0.96 -0.93 -0.95 -0.80 -0.82 -2.17 -0.99 -0.89 
Max Large sedan -3.83 -1.53 -2.93 -2.94 -3.52 -3.94 -1.00 -4.07 
Min Large sedan -0.64 -0.64 -0.61 -0.60 -0.59 -0.56 -0.56 -0.59 
Max SUVs -2.32 -3.22 -1.39 -1.74 -1.35 -1.53 -1.62 -2.93 
Min SUVs -0.44 -0.48 -0.66 -0.47 -0.47 -0.47 -0.45 -0.55 
Max Pickups/vans -6.01 -6.82 -1.38 -1.61 -6.62 -6.75 -5.14 -6.66 
Min Pickups/vans -0.69 -0.78 -0.80 -0.72 -0.70 -0.69 -0.64 -0.63 
Max Luxury -8.66 -8.09 -20.59 -8.23 -7.06 -11.44 -14.94 -20.01 
Min Luxury -0.55 -0.53 -0.55 -0.48 -0.59 -0.50 -0.54 -0.51 
         
Quarter 25 26 27 28 29 30 31 32 
Max small sedan -8.64 -4.45 -9.40 -11.40 -8.90 -13.29 -23.14 -23.93 
Min small sedan -0.90 -0.83 -0.97 -5.76 -0.70 -0.71 -0.81 -0.88 
Max Large sedan -1.48 -2.17 -2.67 -1.48 -4.04 -4.08 -3.42 -1.10 
Min Large sedan -0.56 -1.04 -0.75 -0.56 -0.84 -0.51 -0.47 -0.42 
Max SUVs -2.10 -6.85 -2.27 -5.99 -7.11 -2.55 -2.86 -5.40 
Min SUVs -0.48 -0.70 -0.61 -0.46 -0.47 -0.47 -0.47 -0.44 
Max Pickups/vans -1.35 -1.42 -2.04 -1.73 -2.35 -2.36 -3.48 -3.57 
Min Pickups/vans -0.63 -0.65 -0.76 -0.59 -0.62 -0.61 -0.53 -0.56 
Max Luxury -14.92 -15.10 -18.75 -11.34 -14.14 -11.34 -21.22 -19.11 
Min Luxury -0.54 -0.56 -0.54 -0.54 -0.53 -0.61 -0.63 -0.60 
Calculation of Own Price Elasticities 
 
The own price elasticities were calculated from the coefficient equations. Since elasticity, by definition, is 
the percentage change in quantity divided by the percentage change in price and 
x
x
Q
P

 shows the change in price for a 
one unit change in quantity, quantity is changing by one unit. Therefore, the proportional change in quantity is the 
change in quantity divided by the total quantity: (1/total sales in segment). 
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The percentage change in price is calculated as the change in price divided by the current price. Since 
x
x
Q
P

  
represents the change in price, own price elasticity is therefore:  
 
 
Specifically, with an inverse demand function the calculation is: 
 












segmentin  price
segmentin quantity in  change by the caused pricein  change  thengrepresenti demand oft coefficien
segmentin  sales total
1
 
 
Results of the Revealed Demand System 
 
Applying these formulas to the results of the minimum/maximum coefficients yielded the elasticities for 
the last unit sold in each segment for each quarter. These results are shown in Table 1. The results indicate the 
median elasticities for the 32 quarters between 1989 and 1996 are between –1.18 to –4.71 for small vehicles, -0.65 
to –2.94 for large vehicles, -0.52 to –2.55 for sport utility vehicles,  -0.72 to –4.89 for pickups and –0.54 to –15.10 
for luxury vehicles. These elasticities are summarized in Table 2.  
 
Model Failure in Quarter 2 
 
The model was unable to find a solution for the second quarter. This could be a result of problems in the 
data or incorrectly assuming Cournot-Nash behavior in the model. Problems in the data may include inaccurately 
reported sales or price information. Incorrectly assuming Cournot-Nash behavior when firms behave in a different 
manner would result in firms not satisfying the first order conditions used in this paper’s model. For example, if 
firms take into consideration how other firms will react to output changes, this will change each firm’s first order 
condition.  
 
Another way firms might not act in the Cournot-Nash framework is the possibility that at least one firm 
was not short run profit maximizing. Firms may not profit maximize in the short run to gain market share or 
exposure. This latter situation might be present in the second quarter of 1989. In this quarter, Chrysler achieved the 
highest market share of the 32 quarters in the lucrative SUV market with a 30 percent share. Also in this quarter, the 
alternative producers, mostly Japanese producers were held to a 14 percent share, their lowest market share in this 
segment during the 32 quarters examined. In the following quarters, Chrysler and the alternative producers returned 
to their historical averages of 25 percent and 18 percent respectively. It is possible that Chrysler, the smallest of the 
surviving domestic auto producers, tried some strategic action because it felt particularly vulnerable to the influx of 
Japanese manufacturing capacity in the U.S. that was occurring during this period. During the 1989 to 1990 period, 
the Japanese added almost 200,000 units of capacity in the sport utility segment (Harbour Report). This explanation 
seems consistent with Cournot-Nash behavior observed in other markets. According to this explanation, Chrysler 
was unable or unwilling to maintain its sub-optimal level of output, and relented back to its lower market share. 
 
 
price
Q
Q
P


 (4) 
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Table 2: Min/Max Own Price Elasticities by Segment 
Segment Median Elasticities 
Small -1.18 to -4.71 
Large -0.65 to -2.94 
SUV -0.52 to -2.55 
Pickup -0.72 to -4.89 
Luxury -0.54 to -15.10 
 
 
Table 3: Own Price Elasticity Results Compared to Prior Research 
Author Segment Elasticity range 
Cecchinini European market -2.63 to –4.56 
BLP small -5.66 to -6.43 
Goldberg small –3.29 to –6.22 
Culp* small –1.18 to –4.71 
Goldberg luxury –1.91 to -3.13 
Culp* luxury –0.53 to –15.10 
Culp* Large -0.65 to -2.94 
Goldberg pickups –2.69 to –5.50 
Culp* pickups -0.73 to –4.89 
Culp* SUV -0.52 to -2.55 
Various authors prior to 1972 all -0.6 to –1. 2 
Hess all -0.26 to –1.63 
        * Median results. Results in some quarters may have wider or narrower ranges. 
 
 
Comparison of Elasticity Results to Other Research 
 
The results in Table 3 show that the elasticities estimated by statistical methods are similar to those 
generated by this paper’s mathematical approach. While the results are compiled into one table for comparison, the 
results are not strictly comparable because the ranges have different interpretations.  
 
Statistical studies generate results that report values of variables that generate the ―best fit‖ to match 
observed data. The reported value of the variables may differ from the true value because of random error. The true 
value of the variable may be either slightly higher or slightly lower than the value estimated. Therefore, statisticians 
create a range of values that are likely to contain the true value with certain probability, usually 80, 90, or 95 
percent. This range is called a confidence interval and the further away a value is from the mean, the less likely it is 
the true value of the estimated variable. The ranges reported in Table 3 from other researchers are confidence 
intervals, while the ranges reported in Table 3 from this researcher are not confidence intervals. Instead, they 
indicate the minimum/maximum values of elasticity found that still satisfy the system of first order conditions 
established in the mathematical model.  
 
In theory, the true value of elasticity is just as likely to occur at the extremes of the ranges for a 
mathematical model as values toward the center of each range. In this model, however, the true values are unlikely 
to occur at the extremes because constrained optimization results for maximum and minimum are known to occur at 
the boundaries of their constraints and the nature of the constraints used in the model. In this model, the binding 
constraints were on the marginal cost of each vehicle. In particular, marginal cost of each vehicle was not to exceed 
vehicle price and was to be greater than a significantly low estimate of marginal cost. Since these marginal cost 
constraints have a wider range than is likely to occur, the constrained maximum/minimum optimization results 
based on these constraints are also likely to have a wider range than is likely to occur. Therefore, it is less likely that 
the values at the extremes would be the true values. The range of values could be reduced by tightening the 
restrictions placed on each firm’s cost and profit margin per vehicle, but such changes would require more accurate 
information than was available to this researcher. 
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Another important difference between interpreting a statistical model’s results and this mathematical 
approach is the interconnectivity of the elasticities estimates from one segment to the next. The interconnectivity 
means the elasticity in one vehicle segment affects the elasticity results in the remaining segments. Just as if a 
person has 10 hours of free time to spend on either fishing or working and the person decides to work 6 hours, 
mathematically this person is restricted to spending no more than 4 hours fishing. In the model developed in this 
paper, there is a system of first order conditions and each first order condition must be satisfied. If, for example, the 
value of elasticity for SUVs is thought to be very elastic, say 2.0., this might force the remaining vehicle segment’s 
elasticities to be rather inelastic in order to satisfy the first order conditions. That is, the value taken by one variable 
will limit the range of values taken by other variables in the system.  While the ranges may seem very large taken 
individually, the system as a whole is more restrictive. This result might be useful to a researcher who wishes to 
examine the impact on the entire automobile market rather than one segment. For example, if a researcher wished to 
examine the impact of a tax placed on SUVs on automakers’ profits, the researcher would not just want to know the 
impact of the tax on SUV sales but on total vehicle sales taking into account substitution away from SUVs by 
consumers. 
 
Conclusions and Areas for Future Research 
 
The model developed in this paper succeeded in estimated price elasticities of vehicle demand using solely 
a mathematical approach and without specifying a particular function form for utility. While this paper assumed 
homogenous segments and placed restrictions on market structure and firm behavior, significantly, the estimates of 
vehicle elasticity generated by this method are comparable to the results generated by the various statistical 
approaches of other researchers.  
 
The model developed also has the advantage that the elasticity results in each segment are interconnected. 
The interconnectivity of elasticities restricts the possible values for the entire system of elasticity estimates in the 
automotive market. Therefore, the approach developed in this paper could be attractive to researchers predicting the 
impact on the entire automotive market of changes in taxes or production costs in one or many segments. In 
addition, unlike the prior methods of estimating demand in the automotive industry, the researcher would not have to 
place restrictions on consumer substitution patterns to obtain elasticity estimates.  
  
Another important aspect of this paper is the use of a global optimization program to find ranges of values 
that satisfy a model that could not have been solved explicitly. Future researchers could find this technique useful 
whenever the true nature of a model cannot be perfectly described. 
 
The next advance for this type of mathematical model would be to allow for differentiation among products 
within the same segment. Expanding the model in this way would increase the complexity of the model 
exponentially and require significant processing power. However, as optimization programs become more efficient 
and computers faster, this may not be a limitation. 
 
References 
 
1. Arguea, Nestor, Cheng Hsiao, G.A. Taylor (1994): "Estimating Consumer Preferences Using Market Data-
-An Application to US Automobile Demand," Journal of Applied Econometrics, 9, 1-18. 
2. Arguea, Nestor and Cheng Hsiao (1993): "Econometric Issues of Estimating Hedonic Price Functions: 
With an Application to the U.S. Market for Automobiles," Journal of Econometrics, 56, 243-267. 
3. Bajic, Vladimir (1993): "Automobiles and Implicit Markets: An Estimate of a Structural Demand Model 
for Automobile Characteristics," Applied Economics, 25, 541-551. 
4. Bajic, Vladimir (1988): "Market Shares and Price-Quality Relationships: An Econometric Investigation of 
the U.S. Automobile Market," Southern Economic Journal, 54, 888-900. 
5. Berndt, Ernest R., Ann F. Friedlaender, Judy Shaw-Er-Wang Chaing (1991): "Interdependent Pricing and 
Markup Behavior: An Empirical Analysis of GM, Ford and Chrysler," MIT Press, 55. 
Journal of Business and Economics Research  Volume 2, Number 9 
 80 
6. Berry, Steven, James Levinsohn, Ariel Pakes (1995): "Automobile Prices in Market Equilibrium," 
Econometrica, 63, 841-890. 
7. Cecchini, Laurence (2000): "Differenciation du produit et concurrence," Revue Economique, 51, 103-117. 
8. Consumer Expenditure Survey, Bureau of Labor Statistics (1989-1996). 
9. Fairen, Victor (1996): "A Replicator Theory Model of Competition through Imitation in the Automobile 
Market," Journal of Economic Behavior and Organization, 29, 141-57. 
10. Fershtman, Chaim, Neil Gandal, Sarit Markovich (1999): "Estimating the Effect of Tax Reform in 
Differentiated Product Oligopolistic Markets," Journal of Public Economics, 74, 151-70. 
11. Friedlaender, Ann F., Clifford Winston, Kung Wang (1983): "Costs, Technology, and Productivity in the 
U.S. Automobile Industry," Bell Journal of Economics, 14, 1-20. 
12. Goldberg, P.K. (1995): "Product Differentiation and Oligopoly in International Markets: The Case of the 
U.S. Automobile Industry," Econometrica, 63, 891-951. 
13. Greene, William H. (2000): Econometric Analysis: Fourth Edition, Prentice-Hall. 
14. Harbour Yearbook (1979-1996). 
15. Hess, Alan (1977): "A Comparison of Automobile Demand Equations," Econometrica, 45, 683-701. 
16. Langlois, Catherine C. (1996): "Do Japanese Automakers Maximize Profits? A Systems Analysis of the 
Pricing of Automobile Inventories," American Economist, 40, 65-76. 
17. Langlois, Catherine (1989): "Markup Pricing Versus Marginalism: A Controversy Revisited", Journal of 
Post Keynesian Economics, 12, 127-51. 
18. Levinsohn, James (1988): "Empirics of Taxes on Differentiated Products: The Case of Tariffs in the U.S. 
Automobile Industry," Trade Policy Issues & Empirical Analysis, National Bureau of Economic Research 
Conference Report Series Chicago and London, University of Chicago Press.  
19. Office of Automotive Transportation. 
20. Ward’s Automotive.  
 
